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BUT IS IT ENOUGH?
byJON D. PERKINS
Since the enactment in 1980 of theComprehensive Environmental Re-sponse, Compensation, and Liabil-
ity Act' ("CERCLA") - also known as
"Superfund" - the issue of lender liability
has been one of the statute's most worri-
some aspects for the banking profession and
businesses in general. The term "due dili-
gence," already a household word in securi-
ties law, has become a household word in
environmental law as well and has taken on
great importance to bankers, their lawyers,
and others concerned with secured loans.
With the issuance of its final rule on lender
liability, "Lender Liability Under CERCLA,"
the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") attempted to lend clarity to this
increasingly confusing area of CERCLA Ii-
ability.2 This Comment will analyze the pre-
ruling statutory and case law regarding lender
liability under CERCLA, analyze the new
rule, discuss cases that have applied the new
rule, look at its implications, and finally
provide some possible guidelines to lenders
who may be affected by the new rule in light
of recent decisions implementing the rule.
PRE-RULING STATUTORY
AND CASE LAW
Congress crafted CERCLA to empower
the federal government with the necessary
remedial power to cleanup existing facilities
contaminated by hazardous substances.3
Pursuant to CERCLA, the EPA has two
methods to accomplish hazardous waste
cleanup. First, the EPA may order the re-
sponsible parties to undertake the necessary
remedial cleanup measures, provided the
responsible parties possess the capacity to
perform this task. Alternatively, the EPA
may take action to cleanup contamination
from hazardous substances and subsequently
sue the responsible parties for the cleanup
costs.' CERCLA established a Hazardous
Substances Response Trust Fund
("Superfund") to finance the removal and
remedial response costs.' To establish a
prima facie case of CERCLA liability and
recover Superfund outlays, the EPA must
establish four facts: (1) that the site is a
"facility;" (2) that a hazardous substance
release occurred; (3) that the EPA incurred
response costs; and (4) that the defendant is
a responsible party.6
The lender liability problem has grown out
of Superfund's broad liability and narrow
exemption provisions. Four groups of defen-
dants are potentially liable for response costs
under CERCLA: (1) current owners and
operators of waste facilities; (2) owners and
operators at the time of waste disposal; (3)
generators of hazardous waste; and (4) trans-
porters of hazardous waste.
Because CERCLA did not contain an
explicit standard of liability and because the
legislative history is relatively uninformative,"
the task of fashioning CERCLA's liability
policy fell to the courts. Courts have uni-
formly held that each of the four groups of
potentially liable parties face strict, joint and
several liability unless the environmental harm
caused is divisible.9
1 Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1988)). For a general legislative history of CERCLA, see Grad, A Legislative
History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLuM. J. ENvn. L. 1 (1982).
2 Lender Liability Under CERCLA, 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344 (1992) (codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.1100 and 300.1105 (1992)). In addition, Missouri has enacted a state law which
is almost identical to 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100. See Mo. Rev. Stat. Chapter 427. The federal rule occupies only four pages of the Federal Register -- fairly brief as most important
EPA regulations go. Its brevity may be the reason why the EPA's "Summary of the Proposed Rule" is about the same length as the final rule itself. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18346
- 18,348 (1992). The importance of the final rule may be appraised from the extent of the "Summary of Comments and Changes From the Proposed Rule," which spread over
26 Federal Register pages. More than 350 comments on the proposed rule came from representatives of banking, trade and industry associations, environmental groups, individual
banks, lending institutions, and individuals. Id. at 18,348 - 18,374.
3 Congress' enactment of CERCLA occurred soon after the discovery of contamination at Love Canal and other sites and after the realization that existing environmental statutes
were not equipped to handle these situations. H.R. Rep. No. 96-1016, Part 1, 96 Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.S.C.A.N. 6119, 6128. See alsoComment,
The Liability of Financial Institutions for Hazardous Waste Cleanup Costs Under CERCLA, 1988 Wis .L. REv. 139, 141-142. The term "facility" is defined in 42 U.S.C
§ 9601(9) (1988). The term "hazardous substance" is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1988).
4 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(a), 9606(a), and 9607(a) (1988). See also Susan M. King, Lender's Liability for Cleanup Costs, 18 ENvrn.L.REP. (ENvn.L.INsT.) 241, 249 (1988)
5 The terms "remove" and "removal" are defined in 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (1988). The terms "remedy" and "remedial action" are defined in 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (1988).
6 U.S. v. Aceto Agric. Chem. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1379 (8th Cir. 1989).
7 42 U.S.C. § 9607(aXl)-(4) (1988). See U.S. v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F.Supp. 573, 577 (D.Md. 1986).
8 U-S. v. Northeastem Pharm. & Chem. Co., 579 F.Supp. 823, 838 n.15 (W.D.Mo. 1984), aff'd in part, reu'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S
848 (1987).
9 For cases imposing strict liability, see e.g., U.S. v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 167 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989); Tanglewood East Homeowners
v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1572 (5th Cir. 1988); Levin Metals Corp. v. Parr-Richmond Terminal Co., 799 F.2d 1312, 1316 (9th Cir. 1986); New York v. Shore
Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985). See also U.S. v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 732 n.3 (8th Cir. 1986).
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987) (dictum). In addition, CERCLA was held to provide joint and several liability in U.S. v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F.Supp. 802,
810-811 (S.D.Ohio 1983) and Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 171. MELPRJ
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The lender liability problem concerns only
the first two categories of liable parties and is
largely concerned with CERCLA's definition
in § 101 of "owner or operator" in which the
term "security interest" appears.'0 "Owner
or operator" is defined in § 101(20)(A) as
any person owning or operating [a vessel or
a) facility," but "does not include a person,
who, without participating in the manage-
ment of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of
ownership primarily to protect his secu-
rity interest in the vessel or facility.""
In addition to the security interest exemp-
tion, CERCLA also has an "innocent land-
owner" defense to liability for someone who
falls within the definition of an owner but had
no involvement with the hazardous sub-
stances contaminating the site.'2 This de-
fense arises when the release of hazardous
substances at a facility results from "an act or
omission of a third party other than an
employee or agent of the defendant, or than
one whose act or omission occurs in connec-
tion with a contractual relationship, existing
directly or indirectly, with the defendant."3
The party asserting the defense must estab-
lish, however, that he or she took "due care
with respect to the hazardous substance
concerned" and "took precautions against
foreseeable acts or omissions of any such
third party and the consequences that could
foreseeably result from such acts or omis-
sions.""
While the definition of "owner or opera-
tor" found in § 101(20)(A) does not use the
term "control," to a great extent the lender
liability debate has focused on the question of
how much control is too much.'" In its
statement of the "background" of the final
rule, the EPA noted that while case law
existed with respect to defining how much
control is too much, the language courts
"Courts have uniformly
held that each of the four
groups of potentially liable
parties face strict, joint and
several liability unless the
environmental harm caused
is divisible."
used to describe when control was too great
tended to allow for a great deal of expansion,
causing a small panic in the lending commu-
nity.' 6
Perhaps foremost among the number of
cases to which one might turn for guidance
on this issue is United States v. Fleet
Factors Corp.," decided in 1990. Fleet
Factors Corp., the creditor of a bankrupt
company, foreclosed on the company's
equipment and inventory after the company
ceased operations."' The Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, in denying Fleet Factors'
motion for summary judgment, held that a
secured creditor might be liable if it partici-
pated in the control of a facility "to a degree
indicating a capacity to influence the
corporation's treatment of hazardous
wastes."' 9
In In re Bergsoe,2 o decided by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals in the same year,
the court held that participation in manage-
ment was not shown in a case in which a
lender merely reserved the right to partici-
pate in management in order to protect its
security interest.2' In Bergsoe, the port of St.
Helens, Oregon, had financed Bergsoe Metal
Corp.'s construction of a lead recycling plant
with municipal revenue bonds, pursuant to
which a bank was the trustee for the bond-
holders." The bank, which also had pur-
chased the bonds, forced Bergsoe into Chap-
ter 11 proceedings after Bergsoe had expe-
rienced financial problems. During this pe-
riod, contamination was discovered at the
plant.23 The corporate holder of Bergsoe's
capital stock unsuccessfully claimed that the
port, which had not foreclosed but had
appointed a manager of the plant and held
rights of inspection and re-entry, thereby had
participated in management.2 4 The court
stated: "What is critical is not the rights [the
creditor] had, but what it did." 25
Before Fleet Factors and Bergsoe, fed-
eral district courts had rendered varying
holdings on the issue of lender liability. In
10 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344 (1992).
11 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)A) (1988) (emphasis added).
12 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1988). This defense was added to Superfund by the Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act ("SARA-). Superfund Amendment and
Reauthorization Act of 1986. Pub.L. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986). The amendment was introduced by then-Representative William H. Harsha. R.-Ohio, who stated: "This
change is necessary because the original definition inadvertently subjected those who hold title to a ... facility, but do not participate in the management or operation and are not
otherwise affiliated with the person leasing or operating the ... facility, to the liability provisions of the bill. - Remarks of Rep. Harsha, reprinted in 2 Senate Comm. on Environmental
and Public Works. 97th Cong., 2d Sess.. 2 A Legislative History of CERCLA 945 (Comm. print 1983). quoted in U.S. u. Fleet Factors Corp.. 901 F.2d 1550, 1558 n.11 (11th
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 752 (1991).
13 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)3) (1988).
14 Id.
15 See 57 Fed. Reg. 18.344 - 18,346 (1992).
16 Id.
17 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990) (Fleet Factors 11"), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 752 (1991). See also subsequent history supra at n. 102 - 110.
18 Id. at 1552-1553.
19 Id. at 1557.
20 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990).
21 Id. at 672.
22 Id. at 669.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 672-673.
25 10 at 672.
26
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United States v. Mirabile, the court held
that foreclosure alone, without participation
in a site's day-to-day operations, would not
be enough to establish loss of the security
interest exemption." On the other hand, in
United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust
Co." the court found that a bank had pur-
chased property at foreclosure to protect its
investment, not its security interest, thereby
negating the bank's ability to claim the secu-
rity interest exemption. 28
In response to these cases construing
"participation in management" in such am-
biguous ways, the EPA established a general
rule that "a holder's involvement in finan-
cially related matters - such as periodic
monitoring or inspections of secured prop-
erty, loan financing and restructuring, finan-
cial advice and similar activities - will not
void the exemption."29
ANALYSIS OF THE NEW RULE
It is impossible to discuss in any detail
within the confines of this Comment each or
even most of the EPA's summaries and
explanations.3" Instead, the text of the final
rule itself can best serve as the basis of
understanding it.
The first section of the rule, § 300.1100,
"Security interest exemption," commences
by saying that one whose indicia of owner-
ship are "primarily to protect a security
interest in a vessel or facility, and who does
not participate in the management of the
vessel or facility, is not an owner or operator
under CERCLA Section 107(a)(1) or (2). " 31
The burden of proof that "the defendant is
liable as an owner or operator" is imposed
on the plaintiff in an action brought under
that section or under § 300.1105, "Involun-
tary acquisition of property by the govem-
ment. "3
The indicia of ownership of security inter-
ests include, but are not limited to, the
standard legal instruments and "legal or
equitable title" obtained pursuant to foreclo-
sure.33 Legal title to the security interest itself
is not required.' A holder is a person who
maintains indicia of ownership as defined in
the rule; the definition includes the initial
holder, a subsequent holder, and a receiver.35
The rule first defines when actions are
taken "primarily to protect [a] security inter-
est" by following the holding in United
States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co.:
"[Securing] payment or performance of an
obligation" does not give rise to CERCLA
liability, 6 so long as it is the primary reason
why any ownership indicia are held.31 If the
interest is held "primarily for investment" it
fails to qualify for the exemption.38
The rule then defines the first of the key
terms in § 101(20)(A) - "participating in the
management of a vessel or facility" - by
listing those actions that constitute such
participation and those that do not.39 Affirm-
ing Bergsoe, the rule states that "the mere
capacity to influence, or the unexercised
right to control facility operations," does not
constitute participation.40 Actual participa-
tion is required.4' "[Decision-making) control
over the borrower's environmental compli-
ance" constitutes "participation in manage-
ment"4 2 as does "control at a level compa-
rable to that of a manager ... encompassing
the day-to-day decision making of the enter-
prise with respect to" the "[environmental]
compliance"43 or "[allj, or substantially all"44
of the operations. The rule distinguishes the
operations from the "financial or administra-
tive" aspects of the enterprise." Excluded
from participation in management are the
lender's operations at the inception of the
loan, policing and workout actions, policing
the security interest or loan, and participat-
ing in the management of a facility by taking
a response action under Section 107(a)(1) of
CERCLA. 46
The rule also supplies a useful definition of
"workout." Under the rule, the term refers
to "those actions by which a holder, at any
26 U.S. v. Mirabile. 15 ENvn L. REP. (ENVrL.L.INST.) 20.994 (E.D.Pa., Sept. 4, 1985).
27 632 F.Supp 573 (D.Md. 1986).
28 Id. at 579.
29 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18.345 (1992).
30 The EPA published its proposed lender liability nule on June 24, 1991. The 350 comments that it received are discussed in the EPA's 266-page "Summary of Contents and
Changes From the Proposed Rule," constituting Part III of its April 29.1992, release. Among the more important subjects of these commentswere "Application of the § 101(20XA)
Security Interest Exemption to Other Sections of CERCLA and Other Laws," "Definition of Covered Security Interests," "Definition of 'Participation in Management, "General
Test of Participation in Management," "Foreclosure," 'Post-Foreclosure 'Operation' of a Facility of a Holder." "Burden of Proof." and "Effect of Ithel Final Rule on Holding in
U.S. v. Fleet Factors." 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,348 -18,374 (1992).
31 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100 (1992).
32 Id.
33 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(a) (1992).
34 Id.
35 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(aX) (1992).
36 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(b) (1992).
37 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(bX2) (1992).
38 Id.
39 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(c) (1992).
40 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(cXI) (1992).
41 Id.
42 40 C.F.R. § 3 0 0 .1100(c)(1Xi) (1992).
43 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(c1XiiXA) (1992)
44 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(c)1Xii) (1992).
45 40 C.F.R. § 300.1 100(cX1Xii)(B) (1992)
46 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(c)(2) (1992).
47 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(c)(2)(iXB) (1992)
48 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(d) (1992). 2 7
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time prior to foreclosure and its equivalents,
seeks to prevent, cure, or mitigate a default
by the borrower or obligor, or to preserve, or
prevent the diminution of, the value of the
security."4
The detailed treatment of "Foreclosure on
Property and Post-Foreclosure Activities"
also provides important clarification with
respect to the scope of the security interest
exemption.48 One of the greatest problems
for lenders has been what one should do
after foreclosure to preserve the security
interest exemption when the lender itself
acquires the property.49 The final rule pro-
vides that the indicia of ownership held after
foreclosure will continue to be considered
primarily as protection for a security interest
provided that the holder undertakes to sell,
re-lease property held pursuant to a lease
financing transaction (whether by a new
lease financing transaction or substitution of
the lessee), or otherwise divest itself of the
property in a reasonably expeditious man-
ner, using whatever commercially reason-
able means are relevant or appropriate with
respect to the vessel or facility, taking all of
the facts and circumstances into consider-
ation, and provided that the holder did not
participate in management (as defined in 40
C.F.R. § 300.1100(c)) prior to foreclosure or
its equivalent. "5
The final rule permits the holder to under-
take any response action under CERCLA
and, subject to certain qualifications, to "take
measures to preserve, protect or prepare the
secured asset prior to sale or other disposi-
tion," without losing the protection from
liability.5' The holder is required, however,
"within 12 months following foreclosure," to
list the property for sale with a broker or
agent who deals in the same type of prop-
erty, or to advertise it monthly in a suitable
real estate publication with a circulation of
more than 10,000.52 If a holder outbids or
rejects "an offer of fair consideration," it
establishes thereby that its ownership is not
primarily intended to protect the security
interest, unless such outbidding or rejection
is required by law."
The foregoing is a summary of what the
final rule does. A brief examination of what
it does not do is also in order. The final rule
does not extend its definitions and clarifica-
tions beyond the sections of CERCLA that it
addresses. The EPA specifically refused to
extend the definitions of owner or operator
of a facility under CERCLA's §§ 101(20) and
101(35) to address liability arising from loans
to operators of underground storage tanks
under the Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act.' Nor does the rule pre-empt
any other federal or state laws that may apply
to the activities to which it is specifically
directed.5
Furthermore, the rule does not apply to
trustees and other fiduciaries. The EPA's
stated reason for this should give some
reassurance to these individuals and their
attomeys: "A trustee is not personally liable
for CERCLA cleanup costs solely because a
trust asset is contaminated by hazardous
substances. " 6
The rule also does not require inspections
of sites by holders of security interests; rather,
the rule specifically provides that inspections
shall not be considered evidence of manage-
ment participation. "[A] decision to perform
an environmental audit or inspection for the
purpose of preserving the capacity to assert
the 'innocent landowner' defense does not
void or in any way compromise a holder's
eligibility for the § 101(20)(A) exemption."57
The rule also gives no significance to a
holder's motivation in making such inspec-
tions.58
While the rule does not apply specifically
to any private action, the EPA suggests that
this regulation can have an effect in litigation
to which the government is not a party.59
The EPA argues that the rule is not merely an
agency interpretation of Section 101(20)(A),
but is a "legislative" or "substantive" rule that
has undergone notice and comment pursu-
ant to the Administrative Procedure Act and
as such, it defines the liability of holders for
CERCLA response costs in both litigation
involving the United States and private party
litigation.W
49 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344 - 18.346 (1992).
50 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(d) (1992).
51 40 C.F.R. § 300.11 00(d)(2) (1992)
52 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(dX2Xi) (1992).
53 40 C.F.R. § 300.1 100(dX2Xii) (1992). Fair consideration for the value of the security interest is defined in 40 C.F.R. § 300.1 100(d)(2)(ii)(A) (1992). In essence, the provision
is designed to permit recovery of the amount owed on the loan, plus interest and costs to the lender incident to foreclosure, workout, and other measures. Id.
54 42 U.S.C. § 6991(a)-(i) (1988); 57 Fed. Reg. 18.344. 18,349 - 18.350 (1992). The EPA has issued financial responsibility requirements for local governmental owners and
operators of underground storage tanks ("USTs") containing petroleum. Four alternative mechanisms may be used by local governments to demonstrate financial responsibility
for taking corrective action and compensating third parties for bodily injury and property damage caused by accidental underground storage tank releases. See 58 Fed. Reg. 9.026
(1993).
55 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344. 18.350 (1992). In fact. CERCLA specifically provides that it is not pre-emptive. 42 U.S.C. § 9614(a) (1988).
56 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344. 18.349 (1992). But see City of Phoenix v. Garbage Servs. Co.. 816 F.Supp. 564 (D.Ariz. 1993) (holding that trustee was not operator" of landfill
for purposes of CERCLA liability, even though trustee had authority to control landfill, where trustee was not involved in day-to-day administration but that trustee was "owner"
of landfill for purposes of CERCLA liability even though it held only bare legal title to the landfill).
57 Id. at 18.353.
58 Id. at 18.354. -Participation in management" is an objective, fact-based inquiry. and the legal consequence of the same actions undertaken by two different holders is not changed
by differences in motivation. Id. Such motivation was also held to be irrelevant in Bergsoe. 901 F.2d at 1560 (9th Cir. 1990)
59 57 Fed. Reg. 18.344. 18.368 (1992).
60 Id. However, it is worth noting that many of those who commented on the final rule disagree with the EPA. Id.
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CASES THAT HAVE INTERPRETED
THE NEW RULE
In Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Sonford Prod.
Corp., decided by the United States District
Court for the District of Minnesota in Janu-
ary, 1993, the court ruled that a non-bank
commercial lender was not liable under
CERCLA.6 The lender, Industry Financial
Corp. ("lFC"), made secured loans to an
Ashland tenant, Sonford Products Corp.,
which manufactured wood preservatives. 62
Sonford subsequently went bankrupt.6 1 IFC
held title to Sonford's assets for about a
month, after which they were acquired by
another company, Park Penta Corp." Park
Penta borrowed from IFC to make the acqui-
sition with IFC taking a security interest in the
assets.65 A year later, Park Penta filed for
bankruptcy." IFC could not find another
buyer for the assets and abandoned its secu-
rity interest.67 Ashland, faced later with
cleanup costs on the land leased by Sonford
and others, sued IFC and several other de-
fendants, seeking to hold them liable for
cleanup costs under CERCLA. 61
Citing the EPA rule, the court determined
that merely holding a security interest did not
expose the lender to liability: "The undis-
puted evidence shows that [the lender] did
not participate in the management of either
Park Penta or Sonford or exercise any deci-
sion making control over environmental com-
pliance decisions."'n Likewise, the court
ruled that temporarily holding title did not
subject the lender to liability because the brief
holding of the title "falls squarely within the
indicia of ownership to protect a security
interest' safe harbor provided by statute and
clarified by the EPA's rule." 0
The United States District Court for the
Western District of Michigan in January
1993 decided a similar case involving a
commercial bank in Kelly v. Tiscornia.7'
"Citing the EPA Rule,
the court determined that
merely holding a security
interest did not expose
the lender to liability."
Manufacturers National Bank was a party to
Kelly as a result of its long-standing credit
relationship with Auto Specialties Manufac-
turing Co., owned by the Tiscomia family.72
Furthermore, bank officers had served on
the borrower's board for more than twenty
years." When the borrower encountered
financial troubles, the bank provided addi-
tional credit, and insisted on increased moni-
toring of the borrower's finances." Eventu-
ally the bank stated that it would only provide
further credit if management changes were
made.' It recommended two outside turn-
around specialists,7" one of whom was hired
to serve as Chief Executive Officer but later
was fired.77 Throughout the relationship,
the bank held a first mortgage on the
borrower's property.71
The court ruled that Manufacturers Na-
tional could not be held liable for environ-
mental problems.7 1 It cited the EPA rule's
protections, noting that holding the first
mortgage was not sufficient to prove liabil-
ity. 0 It pointed out that the bank had exer-
cised no control over the borrower's envi-
ronmental compliance.8' Although bank
officers had served on the borrower's board,
the court noted that the board met infre-
quently and only handled pension and capi-
tal spending issues.82 Operational issues,
including environmental compliance, were
handled by an executive committee, which
the bankers did not join." The court also
held that the bank's efforts to monitor and
police its loans were protected by the EPA
rule." As for the turnaround specialist, the
court held that "[tihe bank's insistence upon
outside management under threat of calling
the loan does not constitute impermissible
control."" The court further stated that:
61 810 F.Supp. 1057 (D.Minn. 1993).
62 Id. at 1058.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 1058-1059.




69 Id. at 1060.
70 Id. (referring to 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) and 40 G.F.R. § 300 100(a)).
71 810 F.Supp. 901 (W.D.Mich. 1993).




76 Id. at 903-904.
77 Id. at 904.
78 Id. at 905.
79 Id. at 909.
80 Id. at 905.
81 Id. at 906.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 907.
85 Id. The borrower's eventual firing of the consultant was taken into account in reaching this holding. Id.
86 Id. at 909. 29
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"Jilf banks are held liable under
CERCLA for actions such as oc-
curred in this case (i.e., suggesting or
demanding new management, moni-
toring the borrower's financial health,
and consulting regularly with its cus-
tomer), it is reasonable to assume
that banks will quickly react to such
judicial reasoning by refusing to ex-
tend additional credit or otherwise
continue to work with troubled bor-
rowers. Banks will insulate them-
selves from liability by calling loans
rather than nursing troubled borrow-
ers back to financial health. This
response virtually guarantees an in-
crease in the country's inventory of
abandoned and inactive hazardous
waste disposal sites. ""
In Waterville Indus., Inc. v. Finance
Auth. of Maine, the First Circuit Court of
Appeals held that a Maine government agency
cannot be held liable as an "owner" under
the Superfund law, even though it took title
to land after the default of a mortgage it had
guaranteed and permitted a polluter to oc-
cupy the land under a sale-leaseback ar-
rangement." In 1972, the Finance Author-
ity of Maine's ("FAME"'s) predecessor had
guaranteed a loan taken out by a private
corporation so that it could purchase and
develop the Waterville property." In 1980,
the borrower defaulted and FAME made
"substantial payments" to cure the default."
Immediately thereafter, FAME purchased
the property from the borrower for $1 and
leased it back to the company, giving it the
option to purchase the site for $1 at the end
of the lease." The agreement capped the
total payments that FAME could receive at
$868,982 which corresponded to the amount
of payments made by FAME to cure the
debtor's default.9 ' The agreement was in
force for approximately two years, during
which the borrower is believed to have de-
posited hazardous wastes on the site.92 The
borrower later declared bankruptcy.93 FAME
subsequently won a judgment that it held title
to the land, but after a year, FAME sold the
land." The dispute began in 1983 when the
corporate predecessor of Waterville Indus-
tries, Inc. purchased the property.95 After
discovering that the site was contaminated
with hazardous wastes and executing a
cleanup, Waterville sued FAME under
CERCLA to recover its response costs, not-
ing that FAME had held title to the property
while the wastes were deposited."
Relying solely on the language of CERCLA
§ 101(20)(A), the court rejected Waterville
Industries' argument that through the sale-
leaseback arrangement, FAME became the
owner of the land, rather than just the holder
of a security interest. The court concluded
that when Congress wrote § 101(20XA), it
had in mind "not only the classic case of the
bank mortgage but also equivalent devices
serving the same function, such as lease-
financing arrangements."" The court held
that the limitation on payments under the
lease created a "fair inference" that FAME
was seeking only to recover payments it
made under the loan guarantee that it pro-
vided.98 The court did acknowledge that,
under principles of real estate law, FAME did
become an owner of the Waterville site after
the debtor declared bankruptcy but held that
"such a maturation of ownership does not
divest the owner of protection under
CERCLA's security interest exemption so
long as the owner proceeds within a reason-
able time to divest itself of ownership."9
Although CERCLA itself does not provide
any period for divestiture after the collapse of
a financing arrangement, the court held that
such a "safety zone" was implicit in the
statute.0'" The court concluded by noting
that by providing a "safe harbor" of 12
months within which a security interest holder
may offer property for sale without risking
CERCLA liability in its new rule on lender
liability, the EPA has "followed the same
path."l01
Most recently, in May 1993 the United
States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Georgia handed down its decision on
remand from the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals in the Fleet Factors case ("Fleet
Factors IV'). After denying both parties'
motions for summary judgment in Fleet
Factors 111,102 the court in Fleet Factors IV
held that Fleet did not qualify for the secured
creditor exemption because companies that
it hired to prepare assets for auction mis-
handled hazardous wastes. 03 The court
ruled that Fleet's own activities prior to
foreclosure were not management and were
consistent with activities permitted under the
87 984 F.2d 549 (1st Cir. 1993).
88 Id. at 550.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 550, 552.
91 Id. at 552.
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EPA's rule defining the limits of the secured
creditor exemption.'" The court also held,
however, that the post-foreclosure activities
of liquidator and salvage crews hired by Fleet
Factors failed to comport with Superfund
regulations and aggravated environmental
problems at the.site.os Coupled with Fleet
Factors' holding of a deed on the property to
secure the borrower's debt, the court ruled
that the agents' activities made Fleet liable as
a facility owner under § 107(a)(2) of
CERCLA. '"
The court noted that the handling of
hazardous waste substances indicates imper-
missible involvement in management unless
done in accordance with CERCLA's Na-
tional Contingency Plan ("NCP") or under
the supervision of an NCP on-scene coordi-
nator and that the actions by the agents in
this case were indeed impermissible.to' The
court found that the actions of one agent in
straightening up the site and grouping the
items on the site for sale were protected
activities under 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(d)(2)
of the EPA's lender liability rule.' 0 The
agent's actions in moving drums which con-
tained hazardous substances, however, went
beyond the activities protected under the
rule.' 0 The court also found-that the actions
of another agent who agreed to "broom
clean" the site after retrieving unsold equip-
ment and machinery, also voided Fleet's
exemption. The court said that the second
agent had handled the hazardous waste drums
and removed asbestos insulation "with all the
finesse of a Viking raiding party" and noted
that the second agent "backed into and
crushed the drums with tractors, and scraped
asbestos-laden insulation from the equip-
ment."" 0
IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEw RULE
While the new rule is a step in the right
direction in providing more meaningful safe
harbors for lenders, certain important ques-
tions with which lenders have been grappling
still remain unanswered. It is still unclear, and
consequently left to the courts to decide,
whether certain specific actions commonly
pursued by lenders to protect their security
interests will cause them to lose the security
interest exemption.
For example, may a lender exercise con-
trol over certain distinct areas of the bor-
rower or its business such as appointing a
new manager, approving leases or establish-
ing parameters regarding the approval of
leases without being considered to be partici-
pating in management? Can the lender,
prior to a foreclosure sale, become involved
in managing the facility (directly as a mort-
gagee in possession, or indirectly through
the appointment of a receiver), if the bor-
rower has abandoned the property? The
EPA's commentary to the rule sheds some
light on, but does not directly answer, these
questions. In the commentary, the EPA stated
that a lender should be able to act in a
manner consistent with normal lending prac-
tices,"' but it also has stated that a lender
cannot take control of a facility until after
foreclosure." 2
Another ambiguity concerns how contin-
gent interests, shared-appreciation mort-
gages, or other participating interests will be
treated. Will amounts due to lenders based
on such participating interests be considered
as part of the indebtedness due the lender
and, consequently become part of the amount
that is deemed as fair consideration for the
property? In other words, can a lender, after
foreclosure, reject a purchase offer that does
not include this amount without losing the
security interest exemption? Also, if the
participating interest is recovered by the
lender, will this be considered a "windfall" to
the lender that the EPA can recover if the
government has spent money to clean up the
property?"' Furthermore, would the pres-
ence of a significant participating interest
cause the lender's "indicia of ownership" no
longer to be primarily for protecting a secu-
rity interest, but instead be deemed as prima-
rily an investment, causing the lender to lose
the security interest exemption?"l 4
In addition to these ambiguities, lenders
must be aware of certain limitations in relying
on the rule. First, it is unclear whether the
rule will be binding in a private-party action
against a lender. "15 As mentioned earlier, the
EPA asserts that it does have authority to
issue a "legislative" or "substantive" rule that
would be binding on private-party actions
against lenders." 6 In support of this posi-
tion, the EPA has stated that it issued the rule
as a revision to the National Oil and Hazard-
ous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan,
under the authority of CERCLA §§ 105 and
115."1 Further, as mentioned earlier, the
rule has undergone notice and comment
pursuant to the Administrative Procedure
104 In making this ruling, the court further noted that it was appropriate to ask whether a reasonable, similarly situated secured creditor acting primarily to protect its securitN,
interest would have engaged in the actions taken by the creditor and that even though neither the secured creditor exemption nor the EPA's rule expressly requires consideration
of this factor, such consideration is warranted to ensure consistency between Congress' intent in creating the exemption and application of the exemption. 1993 WL 156633
at *5.
105 1993 WL 156633 at *4-10.
106 Id. at *15. The court also ruled that although Fleet Factors 'arranged for disposal" within the meaning of CERCLA § 107(aX3), its holding title to the plant site precluded
finding it liable under both § 107(a)(2) and (3). Id. at *13-15.
107 Id. at *8.
108 Id. at *7-8
109 Id. at *8-9.
110 Id. at '9.
111 57 Fed. Reg. 18.344, 18,357 (1992).
112 Id.
113 See id. at 18.365.
114 See id. at 18,354, 18,362.
115 See infra at n.128. The rule has been challenged by the Michigan attorney general and the Chemical Manufacturers Association as invalid based on the argument that tin
EPA exceeded its authority under CERCLA Michigan v. EPA. CA. No. 92-1312 (Pet. filed July 28, 1992); Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA. CA No- 92-1314 (Pet. filed Jul%
28, 1992). See also BNA, Environmental Reporter, Aug. 7. 1992, page 1142.
116 57 Fed- Reg. 18.344, 18,368 (1992).
117 Id. mLPR
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Act and, consequently, according to the EPA
is binding on private-party litigation as well as
on government actions.' 18
Second, the rule only governs the security
interest exemption to CERCLA liability that
lenders would experience as an owner or
operator. It does not cover other sources of
strict liability faced by lenders under other
federal statutes (such as the Resource Con-
servation & Recovery Act ("RCRA")), state
or local statutes, or common law. The EPA
has stated, however, that it is working on a
rule to interpret the security interest exemp-
tion under RCRA that would be similar to the
rule for CERCLA." 9
Finally, as previously discussed, a lender
could be liable under CERCLA as a genera-
tor or transporter if the lender arranges for
the disposal of environmental contaminants




One of the best methods of reducing
exposure to environmental liability is to ob-
tain a thorough environmental assessment
of the property before making a loan secured
by such property. Then, update the audit
before foreclosing or otherwise taking title to
the property. The EPA notes that the rule
confirms that while performing an audit is
not necessary to keep the exemption, a
lender can require a borrower to obtain an
environmental audit and to comply with the
recommendations in the audit without losing
the security interest exemption.' 2 ' In requir-
ing such actions, however, the lender should
be careful to leave the decision making in the
hands of the borrower or the lender could
lose the exemption. The rule also states that
118 Id.
119 Id. at 18.349.
120 See supro n.7.
121 57 Fed. Reg. 18.344. 18.347 (1992).
122 Id. at 18.353.
123 Id. at 18.377.
124 Id. at 18.360 - 18.364.
125 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(bh3) (1988).
even if a lender did not obtain an audit before
it first loaned money to a borrower, if it
obtains an audit prior to foreclosure, it can
still maintain its entitlement to the innocent
landowner defense.12 2
B. Loan Documentation
The rule also confirms that a lender may
obtain protections against environmental li-
abilities through indemnities, representations,
warranties, and covenants from a borrower
regarding the presence of hazardous materi-
als and compliance with laws.'12 Loan docu-
ments, however, should be reviewed care-
fully with an eye toward eliminating or modi-
fying any rights granted to the lenders that
could be construed as the lender exercising
control over the decision-making functions
of the borrower with respect to the property.
For example, loan documents should not
permit a lender to appoint the manager of
the property, especially prior to default, but
instead provide criteria for approving or
rejecting a manager proposed by the bor-
rower. Similarly, the loan documents should
provide leasing parameters and criteria for
approving or rejecting leases rather than
absolute discretion to the lender in approv-
ing or rejecting leases.
C. Cleanup
If a cleanup is necessary while the bor-
rower still has possession of the property, or
if there are problems concerning operations
on the property that require a loan workout,
to the extent possible the lender should
exercise all rights under the loan documents
in a manner geared toward obtaining infor-
mation, giving advice, and attempting to
influence the borrower. The lender should
not attempt to control the decision making of
the borrower.
126 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(dX2Xi) (1992).
127 40 C.F.R. § 300.1 100(dX2Xii) (1992).
128 Even if not upheld in Michigan v. EPA or Chemical
Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA (see supra n. 115), the rule still
offers significantinsight to lenders regarding the agency-s
interpretation of the exemption.
D. Foreclosure and Resale of Property
The rule confirms that even though a
lender can acquire property at foreclosure
and still be entitled to the security interest
exemption, the exemption is not assignable
(although any person acting on behalf of or
for the benefit of a lender is covered by the
security interest exemption). 2 4 Furthermore,
the lender must disclose to the purchaser any
environmental information it has on the
property it is trying to convey or else the
lender will lose the innocent landowner de-
fense. 2 - Thus, ultimately, the liability for
cleanup will affect the value of the property.
Clearly, if the potential costs of cleanup to
which the lender will be exposed exceed the
value of the property, the lender should not
bid on that property. Once a lender has
decided to foreclose and is the successful
bidder at the foreclosure sale, the rule re-
quires the lender to follow specific proce-
dures and deadlines for advertising and sell-
ing the property. 2 6 These include attempt-
ing to sell the property as soon as commer-
cially possible after the foreclosure and not
rejecting bids that equal or exceed the debt
owed by the borrower.'
CONCLUSION
As noted by the decisions rendered since
the issuance of the rule, the rule already
serves as a highly useful set of guidelines to
lenders on what actions they can and should
take to maintain the important security inter-
est exemption.'"2 Nonetheless, as noted in
the previous discussion, the rule is not a
panacea; lenders must proceed deliberately,
purposefully, and with circumspection when
making loans secured by property and when
deciding how to protect their secured inter-
est through workout or foreclosure.
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